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Question 
What does the literature indicate about the current conflict dynamics in Egypt (excluding the Sinai 
Peninsula1), including key actors, proximate and structural causes, dynamics and triggers, and 
opportunities for peace and institutional resilience? 
Contents 
1. Overview 
2. Conflict dynamics and triggers 
3. Key actors 
4. Proximate causes of conflict 
5. Structural causes of conflict 
6. External pressures 
7. Opportunities for peace and institutional resilience 
8. References 
1. Overview 
In 2011 Egypt experienced mass protests culminating in the fall of long serving president, Hosni 
Mubarak. The country’s first democratically elected President, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Mohamed Morsi’s, time in power was short-lived. He was deposed by Egypt’s military on 3 July 
2013, following anti-government demonstrations (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Abdul Fatah el-Sisi, 
former head of the armed forces, was elected in June 2014 (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 31). Sisi’s 
presidency has seen a return to military rule. There has also been a rise in the number of terrorist 
attacks in Egypt since he came to power in 2014. 
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Key actors in Egypt, include the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), trade unions, the currently 
banned Muslim Brotherhood, other Salafist parties, and both Salafist and non-Salafist extremist 
groups. 
Conflict in Egypt mainly manifests itself in the form of popular unrest and terrorist attacks. 
Proximate drivers of conflict in Egypt include: 
• Repressive political system: The authoritarian nature of the Sisi regime, and 
widespread repression in Egypt, have the potential to spark a populist backlash.  
• Military control over the judiciary: Military control over the judiciary has increased 
significantly, resulting in an increase in military trials of civilians. This has contributed to 
the atmosphere of repression in Egypt. 
• Migration: Egypt is a source, transit and destination country for migrants. The main risks 
facing migrants are detention by the security forces and being kidnapped and extorted by 
people smugglers. Moreover, the presence of a significant number of Syrian refugees 
has put significant economic pressure on the communities in which they live. 
Structural drivers of conflict include: 
• Economy: Egypt’s faltering economy dominates the literature. Challenges include rising 
inflation, a weak Egyptian pound and high levels of unemployment. They have the 
potential to lead to widespread unrest, having already resulted in nationwide protests. 
• Environmental factors: Climate change is affecting both water and food security in 
Egypt. This increases the risk of popular protests. 
In addition to the above, Egypt faces a number of external pressures. These include tensions 
with Sudan over the disputed Hala’ib triangle, trans-boundary water issues, and the impact of the 
conflict in Libya. 
The literature does not identify any significant opportunities for peace or institutional resilience in 
Egypt. It does however provide some policy recommendations.  
Much of the English language literature on conflict in Egypt consists of opinion pieces produced 
by European and North American think tanks. There are also a small number of peer-reviewed 
journal articles, discussing Egypt post-Arab Spring. Gender is largely addressed in the context of 
sexual violence and in the context of unemployment. 
2. Conflict dynamics and triggers 
Conflict in Egypt principally manifests itself in the form of violent extremism and popular protests. 
The rise of IS2 and other extremist groups in Egypt has meant that terrorist attacks occur 
frequently.3 While the majority of these occur in the Sinai Peninsula,4 there are groups that also 
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operate in the rest of Egypt, most notably in Cairo (see Key actors section below). The rise in 
violent extremism in Egypt can be attributed to both the proximate and structural drivers of 
conflict discussed below. 
An ACLED conflict trends report suggests that levels of violence in 2016 were down on those of 
the previous year. However, it notes that there were ‘multiple, discrete, political contentions 
across Egypt’ (p. 8). According to the report ‘the continued consolidation of political authority by 
the Sisi regime coupled with a reserved approach to non-violent resistance suggests that 2017 
will see a continuation of low- level protest activity that remains undeveloped’ (ACLED, 2016, p. 
8). The report also finds that 2016 saw a move away from protests organised by religious groups, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, towards protests organised by labour and trade unions 
(ACLED, 2016, p. 8). According to an article published by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, there were 1,117 reported labour protests in 2015, and a further 493 
protests from January to April 2016 (Acconcia, 2016). 
3. Key actors 
Key actors in Egypt include the military government, trade unions, Salafist parties and extremist 
groups. 
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) 
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) governed Egypt following the fall of Hosni 
Mubarak. Following the removal from power of Morsi in 2013, the military governed again. In 
June 2014, Sisi, former head of the armed forces, was elected as President winning 96 per cent 
of the vote (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016b, pp. 11 – 12). The military has 
subsequently consolidated its control over almost all aspects of the state apparatus in Egypt. 
Trade Unions 
While popular protests have reduced under the current government, due to state repression, 
trade unions remain active and strikes and labour protests continue (Acconcia, 2016). 
Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) 
The EFITU is an umbrella organisation for non-governmental labour unions (Acconcia, 2016). It 
was reportedly one of the most important opposition forces during the 2011 protests in Egypt 
(Acconcia, 2016). According to an article published by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, ‘despite capitalizing on the labor movement’s opposition to Morsi to propel him to power, 
Sisi’s presidency continued a policy of state capitalism, neglecting the protesters’ requests for 
social justice’ (Acconcia, 2016). While the government’s targeting of the EFITU has reportedly 
stopped it becoming a more structured organisation, the EFITU has support at the local level, 
and continues to organize new strikes (Acconcia, 2016) 
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Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) 
The ETUF is the government-run labour union syndicate (Acconcia, 2016). In 2015, the ETUF 
issued a document declaring its intention to oppose and marginalize the EFITU (Acconcia, 2016). 
Salafist parties 
All Salafist parties in Egypt share some common goals. For example, they all seek the 
implementation of Sharia law to protect Egypt’s ‘Islamic identity’ from westernisation and 
secularisation (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, they all also reportedly address the major 
‘social realities’ in Egypt, rejecting the corruption, dictatorship, and social inequality that led to the 
2011 revolution. They reportedly also engage with the widespread popular demand for popular 
sovereignty, in the sense of regular elections and a separation of powers to prevent autocratic 
rule. They have therefore started to engage with ‘some’ democratic principles, thereby setting 
themselves apart from ‘conventional notions of politically quietsist and militant Salafists known for 
their anti-democratic outlook’ (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 5). 
Muslim Brotherhood 
The fall of Morsi’s government was followed by a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
Egyptian government declared them a terrorist organisation in December 2013, and in August 
2014 the organisation’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was banned by an 
Egyptian court (Tobin et al, 2015, p. 32). After its fall from power, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been unable to re-enter the political system (Lynch, 2016, p. 31). Despite increasing elite 
criticism of Sisi’s regime, it has been unable to ‘reassure a hostile Egyptian public or to establish 
new political alliances’ (Lynch, 2016, p. 31). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood remains 
internally divided over its political strategy and over key ideological questions about violence and 
political participation (Lynch, 2016, p. 31).  
Hizb al-Nur 
Founded in May 2011, this is the largest Salafist party, although the extent of their support is 
unclear. Its stronghold is in Alexandria, but it is active in all of Egypt’s governorates (Ranko & 
Nedza, 2015, p. 2). For Hizb al-Nur citizenship is linked to a person’s ‘quality and quantity of 
creed.’ Despite the fact that Hizb al- Nur states that non-Muslims would be granted the ‘same 
rights and same duties’ as Muslims, their view on citizenship means that there is no equality 
before the law for all individuals, especially not for non-Muslims (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, pp. 5-6). 
Moreover, Hizb al-Nur takes a fairly rigid approach to the implementation of Sharia law, in 
contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is more flexible on this (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 6). 
Al-Watan 
This party was founded in January 2013 by the ex-president of the al-Nur party, Abd al-Ghafur, 
after he split away from the Hizb al-Nur (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 2). The party views itself as 
more inclusive and open towards Christians than other Salafist parties, as well as being more 
open towards non-Salafist Muslims (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 7). It also portrays itself as 
belonging to the political centre. 
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Al-Fadila 
This is a Cairo-based party, which was founded in March 2011. It was the first Salafist party in 
Egypt (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 2). Unlike Hizb al-Nur and al-Raya, al-Fadila takes a relatively 
relaxed approach to the implementation of Sharia law (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 7). 
Al-Raya 
Al-Raya was founded by Salafist Hazim Salah Abu Ismail, who is reportedly particularly popular 
among the young people in Salafist circles (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 3).  For al-Raya all rights 
and freedoms are defined by a strict and literal understanding of Sharia law (Ranko & Nedza, 
2015, p. 6).  Moreover, the party does not regard the nation-state as the primary framework for 
politics. Rather, it wants to establish a political and economic union of Arab-Islamic states (Ranko 
& Nedza, 2015, p. 6). 
Extremist groups 
Islamic State – Sinai Peninsula (previously known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) 
The Islamic State - Sinai Peninsula is reportedly distinct from the Islamic State in Egypt 
(discussed below). However, while it mainly operates in the Sinai Peninsula5 the group has 
claimed responsibility for attacks in other parts of Egypt, including a Cairo car bombing, and 
series of grenade attacks that targeted police forces and killed civilians in January 2014, and an 
attack on a military base in Western Egypt in July 2014.6 The Islamic State – Sinai Peninsula is 
believed to have anywhere between a few hundred and a thousand members.7 
Islamic State in Egypt 
The Islamic State in Egypt reportedly emerged in 2015, when it claimed responsibility for the 
bombing of the Italian Consulate in Cairo. The group was responsible for nine further attacks 
between July 2015 and June 2016. Of these, five took place in Cairo, and one each in Giza, 
Daqhalia, Damietta, and Qalyubia (The Tahrir Instiute for Middle East Policy, 2016a, p. 16). The 
size of Islamic State in Egypt remains unclear. 
Ajnad Misr 
Formed in January 2014, this is a Cairo-based group, which has, to date, carried out its attacks 
in Greater Cairo (Ranko & Nedza, 2015, p. 8). The current Egyptian government is the group’s 
primary enemy. It has referred to its attacks as ‘Retribution is life.’ While Ajnad Misr appears to 
adhere to militant Salafist ideology, it does not refer to anyone as unbelievers or apostates. It 
refers to the police, army, and security apparatus as ‘criminal agencies.’ Therefore, instead of 
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justifying its actions with takfir8 like some of the other groups operating in Egypt, it calls for 
vengeance and retribution. According to Ranko & Nedza, Ajnad Misr therefore ‘functions as an 
ideological hinge: as representatives of the militant Salafist strand, it potentially opens up for non-
Salafists by tying its call for jihad to retribution’ (2015, p. 13). The size of Ajnad Misr remains 
unclear. 
Al-Furqan Brigades 
This group operates throughout Egypt. In 2013 it attacked merchant ships in the Suez Canal 
using rocket- propelled grenades. It also launched two rocket-propelled grenades at a satellite 
station in the Cairo suburb of Maadi in the same year. The research undertaken for this report 
has not found any information about more recent attacks. The group is believed to have close 
ties to other extremist groups. Ideologically, the group believes the current government to be 
illegitimate, as it does not apply sharia law.9 The size of Al-Furqan Brigades remains unclear. 
Non-Salafist/ Jihadi violent groups 
Since 2014, a number of non-Salafist violent groups have emerged in Egypt. These include: 
Revolutionary Punishment 
Formed in January 2015, this is the newest non-Salafist violent group in Egypt (Awad & Hashem, 
p. 12). By September 2015, the group had reportedly carried out around 150 attacks across 
sixteen governorates. It also claims to have killed at least 157 members of the security forces 
(Awad & Hashem, p. 13).  The group’s methods include planting IEDs targeting infrastructure 
and police convoys, conducting armed ambushes of police checkpoints, and assassinating 
senior police officers (Awad & Hashem, p. 13). While there is very little evidence to suggest that 
the group has Islamist tendencies, there is reportedly a risk that it could be influenced by Islamist 
elements (Awad & Hashem, p. 13). 
The group is also believed to be the most organised among the new non-Salafist violent groups. 
It has recorded every attack it has carried out, which suggests it may have a central command 
and access to a logistical network and financing (Awad & Hashem, p. 13).  The size of 
Revolutionary Punishment remains unclear. 
Popular Resistance Movement 
This was the first non-Salafist violent group to emerge in Egypt. It was formed in 2014 (Awad & 
Hashem, p. 12). The group does not appear to have a clear leadership. The Popular Resistance 
Movement is active throughout Egypt, and its modus operandi is low-violence attacks generally 
using rudimentary weapons. These include crude improvised explosives, Molotov cocktails, and 
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stun or ‘sound’ grenades.10 The group’s attacks have reportedly become increasingly 
sophisticated and violent.11 The Popular Resistance Movement’s ideology is reportedly 
‘religiously nationalist’ rather than jihadist. However, it reportedly has conservative Salafist 
tendencies, in addition to being anti-capitalist. Recently, it has shifted from attacking government 
and police targets to economic targets.12 It is unclear how many members the Popular 
Resistance Movement has.  
4. Proximate causes of conflict  
Many of the proximate causes of conflict in Egypt are inter-linked. 
Repressive political system 
According to Mansour, Egypt has experienced ‘a shift from a full revolution to an almost-full 
restoration of the Mubarak regime: civilian, as well as military and oligarchic, networks are on the 
rise, Mubarak-era political parties are forcing their way back into the political sphere, and political 
and civil liberties have been severely curbed’ (2016, p. 7). Parliamentary elections were held in 
2015. Voter turnout was low, standing at 28 per cent. Parliament is reportedly dominated by ‘Sisi 
loyalists’ (Sharp, 2016, p. 2). 
Sisi’s government has been accused of committing serious human rights abuses against both 
secular and Islamist opponents (Sharp, 2016, p. 3). Forced disappearances have been on the 
rise since he came to power. Moreover, security forces have reportedly carried out abductions in 
public and in ‘broad daylight’ (Cachalia, 2015). There are also reports of extra-judicial killings 
(Cachalia, 2015). An Amnesty International report documents the widespread use of torture to 
extract ‘confessions’ of ‘terrorist’ activity from political activists and protesters, including students 
and children (2016). Torture is also used to force victims to implicate others (Amnesty 
International, 2016, p. 8). Methods used include electric shocks to sensitive body parts, such as 
the genitals, lips and ears; suspension by the limbs while handcuffed and naked; and sexual 
abuse, including rape; beatings and threats (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 8). However, 
according to a report by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, counter-terrorism operations 
against the Muslim Brotherhood had ‘effectively ceased’ in the second quarter of 2016, with no 
Muslim Brotherhood related arrests for terrorism related offences being reported during the 
period April – June 2016 (2016a, p. 22). 
The government has also taken steps to curtail religious freedom. Around 27,000 mosques were 
reportedly closed down in 2015, and mosque activities have been subject to strict regulation, 
including who can preach, and what can be discussed during sermons. Some classical Islamic 
literature has also been banned (Cachalia, 2015). 
According to an article published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 
the risk of social unrest caused by the economic challenges discussed later on this report, will be 
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exacerbated by this government repression and the abuses perpetrated by security forces 
(Luengo – Cabrera, 2016, p. 2). 
Military control over the judiciary 
Military jurisdiction in Egypt is expanding, and military trials of civilians are increasing. According 
to an article published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, strong public support for the 
government, and the absence of a parliament prior to the 2015 elections, made it possible for 
Sisi to issue hundreds of presidential decrees unilaterally. Many of these undermined the rule of 
law. Sisi issued Law 136 in 2014, which granted the military the authority to protect public and 
state facilities for two years. Military courts were granted jurisdiction over any alleged crimes 
occurring on public land (Aziz, 2016). In August 2016 the new parliament approved extending 
Law 136 of 2014 for another five years until 2021 (Aziz, 2016). 
A number of amendments to the Military Judiciary Law that count state properties and institutions 
as military property, mean that the military courts’ jurisdiction has become extensive. Buildings, 
factories, companies, or roads owned by the government have become military spaces where 
civilian courts no longer have jurisdiction. According to Aziz, an indictment by a military court is 
almost always a guarantee of conviction (Aziz, 2016). 
In January 2016, parliament approved a new anti-terrorism law, which specifies sentences for 
various terrorism-related offences, protects the police from penalties for ‘proportionate use of 
force,’ and fines journalists for contradicting the government’s version of any terrorist attack 
(Sharp, 2016, p. 3).  
The military’s expanding control over the judiciary is closely linked to the repressive political 
system in Egypt. According to a paper published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, the 
leadership’s ‘overt manipulation’ of the legal system could create divisions between the regime 
and its liberal supporters (Marshall, 2015). 
Migration 
Egypt is a source, transit, and destination country for migrants. Irregular migrants in Egypt have 
reportedly been subjected to police violence and killings (EUI, 2016, p. 1). A report by the North 
Africa Mixed Migration Taskforce details a number of routes used by migrants coming from 
Sudan to Egypt. These are: 
▪ Aswan-Abu Simbel-Lake Nasser – mainly used by Sudanese and Eritrean migrants. 
▪ East Oweinat in the West of Egypt -  mainly used by Sudanese and Eritrean migrants. 
▪ Halayeb-Shalateen (due to the high military presence in the Red Sea region, this route 
sometimes also crosses the Allaqi Valley) -  mainly used by Sudanese and Eritrean 
migrants. 
▪ Through the north of the country from Libya via Matruh – mainly used by Libyans 
(NAMTF, 2015, pp. 29 – 33). 
Dangers facing migrants and refugees include detention and kidnapping for extortion by people 
smugglers (NAMTF, 2015, pp. 29 – 33). While this was principally a problem in the Sinai 
Peninsula before that route effectively closed due to Israel cracking down on irregular migrants, 
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there have also been reports of migrants being kidnapped for extortion in the Aswan area 
(NAMTF, 2015, pp. 29 – 33). 
The presence of around 300,000 Syrian refugees in Egypt has reportedly exacerbated pre-
existing vulnerabilities in the communities in which they live, and has put pressure on the local 
economy, especially in education and health services.13 
5. Structural causes of conflict 
There is consensus in the literature that Egypt’s faltering economy is the country’s greatest 
challenge and presents the greatest risk to stability. Egypt also faces a number of environmental 
challenges, which are closely linked to the economic problems facing the country. 
Economy 
According to a policy brief published by the Orient-Institut Beirut (OIB), 26.3 per cent of 
Egyptians were living below the World Bank’s poverty line in 2014. In 2005, the figure was lower, 
standing at 19.6 per cent of the population (Mansour, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, a third of Egypt’s 
youth are unemployed and three out of five children are malnourished (Mansour, 2016, p.2).  
In the second half of 2016, Egyptians faced rising electricity prices, high inflation, tax increases 
and staple food shortages (ACLED, 2016, p. 8). This led to an increase in small-scale protests. 
However, according to an ACLED report on conflict trends in Egypt, there have not been large-
scale protests due to the continuing detention of journalists, lawyers, and protest organisers 
(ACLED, 2016, p. 8). Mansour provides more detailed statistics on the economy: annual GDP 
growth reportedly fell from 5.1 per cent in 2010, to 2 per cent in 2016. Moreover, as of May 2014, 
the Egyptian pound lost more than 19 per cent of its value, inflation reached 10 per cent and the 
budget deficit reached 11.5 per cent in 2014/2015. Egypt’s foreign currency reserves also 
reportedly halved from USD 36 billion in 2011 to just USD 13.5 billion in 2016 (Mansour, 2016, p. 
5). Moreover, tourism revenues, on which Egypt is highly dependent, reduced significantly as a 
result of the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula by terrorists in October 
2015, and due to an Egypt Air crash in May 2016. Export earnings have also declined because 
of lower oil prices (crude oil makes up 40 percent of total exports) and due to the economic 
recession in the European Union (Adly, 2016, p. 7).  According to Mansour, ‘poverty, social 
justice and inequality remain unaddressed and are rather used to justify harsh austerity 
measures that provide only temporary solutions’ (Mansour, 2016, p. 12).  However, the African 
Economic Outlook paints a brighter picture, arguing that if the Egyptian government continues 
with its economic reform programme, the economy should recover steadily (Bhakta et al, 2016, 
p. 2). 
The military controls a significant proportion of Egypt’s economy. It has reportedly moved from 
operating a shadow economy to overseeing major economic projects. According to a report 
published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, by the time Sisi was elected the military had 
‘subordinated the private sector as the economy’s subcontractors, also serving as the nation’s 
general contractor’ (Aziz, 2016). The military’s pre-existing businesses have reportedly expanded 
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their operations in a wide range of industries, including agriculture, hotels and resorts, 
manufacturing of consumer goods, and housing (Aziz, 2016). According to a paper published by 
the Carnegie Middle East Center, there is a risk that ‘the EAF’s new allies and heightened 
influence may bring out cleavages that had been submerged, as factions struggle to stake a 
claim to new economic and political turf’ (Marshall, 2015). 
Employment related challenges 
Employment related challenges facing Egypt include high levels of unemployment, under-
employment, a large informal sector, and depressed wages (ILO, p. 7). According to an ILO 
report, just one third of paid employees in Egypt have legal contracts, and of those only 30 per 
cent have social insurance and 21 per cent have medical insurance (ILO, p. 17).  
Female labour participation in Egypt stands at just 18.5 per cent (Mansour, 2016, p. 10). 
Moreover, female unemployment reportedly stands at 49.8 per cent (Ghafar, 2016, p. 5). 
Structural bias against women reportedly starts from an early age, as fewer women attend 
primary and secondary school than men. Rural women are even more disadvantaged, as they 
are less likely to obtain employment in the formal sector than women living in urban areas 
(Ghafar, 2016, p. 5). Reasons cited for the high unemployment rate amongst educated women 
are: 
• Decreasing employment in the public sector, which was historically one of the largest 
employers of Egyptian women (Ghafar, 2016, p. 5). 
• Cultural and practical barriers to entry for females in the private sector (Ghafar, 2016, p. 
5). 
• Limited job opportunities for women in the private sector, with most opportunities limited 
to the areas of education and healthcare (Ghafar, 2016, p. 5).  
Demographics are closely related to Egypt’s employment related challenges. Egypt’s youth 
population (15 – 29 year olds) rose from 13.3 million in 1988 to 22.2 million in 2006 (Ghafar, 
2016, p. 5). One policy brief published by the Brookings Institution states that there is a direct 
correlation between youth unemployment and the socio-economic and political stability of a state 
(Ghafar, 2016, p. 1). The private sector has reportedly been unable to meet the increased 
demand for jobs (Ghafar, 2016, p. 5). University level graduates have the highest rate of 
unemployment at 34 percent, compared to 2.4 percent among youth with less than primary level 
education (Ghafar, 2016, p. 1). Forty-eight per cent of employed young people are in jobs that do 
not match their level of education (Ghafar, 2016, p. 6). This has resulted in graduate degree 
holders staging a significant number of anti-government protests about the lack of government 
jobs in research and academia (Ghafar, 2016, p. 6). Moreover, according to the ILO, 91 per cent 
of young people in Egypt work in the informal sector (2015, p. 17). The consequences of the 
dominance of informal sector employment include the loss of potential tax revenue for the 
government, and a lack of social and financial security for workers (Ghafar, 2016, p. 6).  
Ghafar argues that the combination of a youth bulge and high unemployment will pose security 
challenges in the future (2016, p. 5). In 2015, there were over 1,117 labour protests, an average 
of 93 protests per month, in 26 out of 27 governorates. Moreover, public sector unions have been 
demanding higher wages and social allowances to protect themselves against the reduction in 
purchasing power due to rising inflation (Luengo-Cabrera, 2016, p. 2). 
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Environmental factors 
There are a number of environmental factors, which constitute potential drivers of conflict in 
Egypt. 
Water insecurity 
According to a policy brief on climate related challenges facing Egypt, Egypt’s reliance on the 
Nile for fresh water means that climate impacts on the availability of water from the Nile will 
present significant threats to the food security, water security, energy security and the livelihoods 
and wellbeing of those directly and indirectly dependent on it (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). Existing 
pressures on Nile water resources, such as increased water consumption and the disruption 
caused by dam-building in upstream countries, will reportedly be exacerbated by climate change 
impacts such as greater variability in seasonal flows, less available water, and increasing 
salinization (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, it is argued that economic growth in Egypt threatens 
the quality and quantity of water resources, exacerbating the existing contamination problem, 
and contributing to water insecurity (Finaz, 2015, p. 1).  
The policy brief also argues that heavy government subsidies encourage inefficiencies, and that 
unequal distribution of water contributes to water insecurity. It is noted that water insecurity, and 
particularly water shortages, have already caused popular protests in Egypt, for example in July 
2010, in the southern governorate of Minya (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). 
Food insecurity 
The loss of agricultural land due to urban expansion is a considerable problem in Egypt. 
Moreover, climate impacts on the quality and quantity of global food production also contribute to 
rising food prices, which is problematic as Egypt is extremely dependent on food imports. For 
example, it is the world’s largest wheat importer (Finaz, 2015, p. 2). Egypt also has a long history 
of subsidising food. Government removal of subsidies reportedly has the potential to lead to 
protests and violent riots (Finaz, 2015, p. 2). 
Rapid urbanisation 
Rapid urbanisation and ‘urban encroachment’ around metropolitan areas of Cairo and 
Alexandria, as well as around the cities in the Nile delta, are reportedly increasing putting 
pressure on urban infrastructure, basic service provision, and agricultural productivity (Finaz, 
2015, p. 2). One policy brief suggests that if urbanisation is not properly planned, it could result in 
increased unemployment, poverty, and violence in urban areas. It adds that urban violence has 
already been identified as a major risk in Egypt’s growing cities, noting that daily incidences of 
urban violence are already reported throughout Egypt (Finaz, 2015, p. 2). Cairo is reportedly at 
particular risk, as it is one of the most densely populated cities in the world (Finaz, 2015, p. 2). 
6. External pressures 
Egypt faces a number of external pressures and trans-boundary challenges, which threaten 
domestic stability.  
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The Hala’ib triangle 
The dispute between Egypt and Sudan over the Hala’ib triangle dates back to 1958. In 1995 
Egypt began a policy of ‘Egyptianising’ the disputed territory. Egypt has been building police 
stations, opening civil registers, and teaching children in the territory using the Egyptian 
curriculum. It has also been establishing administrative units, holding elections and including the 
Hala’ib triangle on maps of Egypt. 14  Should Sudan decide to opt for international arbitration 
Egypt’s actions could reportedly affect the outcome in its favour.15 Recently, there have been 
tensions between Egypt and Sudan over gold mines in the territory.16 
Trans-boundary water issues 
Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a hydroelectric dam on the 
Blue Nile has caused tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt (Tadesse, 2012). According to one 
policy brief, increasing internal pressure on the Egyptian government to address food, water, and 
energy insecurity, reportedly means that there is a ‘real risk’ that the Egyptian government may 
turn to nationalism and seek to prevent any further upstream water infrastructure development by 
force (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). This might be done by supporting rebel groups or creating political 
destabilization, and fragility in the region (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). 
Conflict in Libya 
Egypt intervened militarily in Libya in response to terrorist violence reportedly originating in the 
country, and directed against Egyptian citizens living and working there. In February 2015, 
Islamists, believed to be allied with IS, released a video in which 21 Egyptian hostages were 
beheaded on a beach near Sirte in Libya. The next day Egypt responded with air strikes against 
terrorist camps in Derna, an IS stronghold in eastern Libya (Sharp, 2016, p. 9). 
Transfer of the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia 
In April 2016, Sisi ceded control of the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia, in 
exchange for political backing and financial investment (ACLED, 2016, p. 8). This resulted in 
nationwide protests (ACLED, 2016, p. 8). A court ruling annulled the transfer in June 2016 
(ACLED, 2016, p. 8).  
                                                 
14 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20151231-a-meeting-of-the-sudanese-and-egyptian-presidents-will-be-
perfunctory/ 
15 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20151231-a-meeting-of-the-sudanese-and-egyptian-presidents-will-be-
perfunctory/ 
16 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=26799&rehref=%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Bounda
ry+news+Headlines 
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7. Opportunities for peace and institutional resilience 
The research undertaken for this report has found no information on specific opportunities for 
peace and institutional resilience in Egypt. However, the literature does provide some policy 
recommendations. These include: 
Ending repression 
There is a general consensus in the literature that the government needs to improve prison 
conditions, release those in detention who have not committed criminal acts, and end forced 
disappearances, extrajudicial killing, and sexual abuse. This is due to the fact that government 
repression is widely believed to serve as a recruitment tool for violent extremists (see for 
example Amnesty International, 2016 and Awad & Hashem, 2015). In June 2016, the Ministry of 
Interior reportedly announced that low-ranking police officers’ weapons would be turned in when 
they are on leave (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016a, p. 26). Moreover, in March 
2016 MPs proposed amendments to the Police Law, which aimed to reduce human rights 
violations. These included bans on carrying firearms while off duty, and stiffer penalties for 
violations (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016a, p. 26). It is not clear whether either 
of these changes have been implemented. 
Economic reform 
One policy brief suggests that foreign investment and a reduction in the army’s role in the 
economy are essential in countering the challenges facing Egypt today (Finaz, 2015, p. 3). 
Another policy brief states that the government needs to adopt a more inclusive understanding of 
citizenship to overcome these challenges. It suggests that this can be achieved by ‘increasing 
the minimum wage; creating a stable environment for investment; initiating projects that would 
create jobs and rationalizing public spending on projects’ (Mansour, 2016, p. 12). It is argued that 
this would empower the poor economically and politically thereby reducing the ‘disconnect’ 
between state and society (Mansour, 2016, p. 12). However, according to Adly, Egypt’s options 
for improving its economic situation are very limited, due to its dependency on external factors. 
Most notable among these is the health of the regional and global economies, which is currently 
uncertain (2016, p. 17). He argues that even if the government were able to reduce spending, 
this would come at the expense of economic recovery, in a way that would hinder economic 
growth and job creation (Adly, 2016, p. 17). 
Addressing population growth 
According to one policy brief, voluntary sexual and reproductive health measures should be a 
priority for tackling increasing climate and resource pressures resulting from rapid population 
growth (Finaz, 2015, p. 3). 
Addressing food and water insecurity 
Sustainable agricultural production systems and improved water infrastructure are reportedly key 
for coping with Egypt’s growing population, and limited productive land and water (Finaz, 2015, 
p. 3). Moreover, according to one policy brief, better Nile river management would facilitate 
climate change adaptation and help build peace in the region (Finaz, 2015, p. 1). 
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